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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Introduction. 
This is the Reply Brief of the Idaho Transportation Department (the Department). 
The Department seeks review of the District Court's decision setting aside an 
Administrative License Suspension entered by The Department's Hearing Official. 
b. Characterization of the Issues. 
The Department has characterized the issues as follows: 
1. The Hearing Official did not err by finding that there is not an inherent margin 
of error in the test result produced by the Lifeloc FC 20. 
2. The Hearing Official properly determined that the Lifeloc FC 20 had been 
calibrated in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures of the Idaho 
State Patrol. 
3. The Hearing Official's failure to acknowledge the Lifeloc FC 20's margin of 
error did not deny Ms. Elias-Cruz her ability to meet her burden or obtain a 
fair and impartial hearing. 
The Respondent re-characterizes the issues in responding to the issues set out by 
the Department. The reply argument that follows maintains the organization of the issues 
as initially set out by the Department and addresses the arguments of Ms. Elias-Cruz in 
the context of the issues characterized by the Department. 
II. Argument. 
1. 
The Hearing Official did not err by finding that there is not an inherent margin of 
error in the test result produced by the Lifeloc FC 20. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Ms. Elias-Cruz argues that the Department's Hearing Official's decision to 
sustain the license suspension was not based on substantial and competent evidence when 
he disregarded testimony that the breath testing equipment, the Lifeloc FC 20 suffers 
from an inherent margin of error. 
Ms. Elias-Cruz's argument is nothing more than a policy argument offered to 
change the present state of Idaho Law. Ms. Elias-Cruz suggests that the margin of error 
"should be taken into account" (emphasis added) (Respondent's Brief, p. 5). 
Ms. Elias-Cruz argues generally that since a person with a .02 blood alcohol 
content shows no external signs of intoxication, something more than a failed breath 
alcohol result should be the basis of an Administrative License Suspension. However, a 
failed evidentiary test is precisely what I.C. §§ 18-8002A( 4) and 18-8004 contemplate as 
the basis of an Administrative License Suspension. 
The need to demonstrate the existence of external evidence of intoxication is 
clearly rejected in the Administrative License Suspension context, Reisenauer v. State, 
Dept. of Transp. , 1451daho 948, 188 P.3d 890 (2008). 
Ms. Elias-Cruz suggests that there is no external evidence of intoxication. 
However, that argument is not based on the Record in this matter. The record indicates 
that Trooper Schwecke observes the smell of an alcoholic beverage and notes an 
admission by Ms. Elias-Cruz to the consumption of alcohol (ALS R. p. 006). 
Next Ms. Elias-Cruz argues that the existence of an inherent margin of error has a 
greater impact on the accuracy of test results at a .02 level than at a .08 leveL The 
Legislature determined at what level a test failure would result in a suspension, be it at 
.02 for a driver under the age of21 or .08 for an adult (or a .20 for an aggravated DUl). 
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A margin of error of plus or minus 10% or a margin of error of .005 means that a 
driver with a .08 blood alcohol could "actually have a blood alcohol content" below .08 
(.075) just as a driver under the age of 21 with a .02 blood alcohol could have an actual 
blood alcohol content of .015. The fairness of that result is not before the Court on 
judicial review and was not before the Hearing Official originally. (I.C. § 67-5279) 
Ms. Elias-Cruz's argument that the Standard Operating Procedures recognize a 
margin for error in the performance verification standards, (Idaho Breath Alcohol 
Standard Operating Procedure § 5.1.5) is not the basis for an argument that the test results 
should recognize a margin of error for purposes of demonstrating a driver's breath 
alcohol content. I 
What Elias-Cruz suggests is that the Hearing Official must consider that there is a 
potential margin of error which is then compared against a performance verification 
standard. Such an argument is not among the matters to be shown by Ms. Elias-Cruz 
pursuant to I.e. § 18-8002A(7). The conclusion of Ms. Elias-Cruz's argument also 
creates a standard which is not now part of the Idaho State Police's Standard Operating 
Procedures. 
Nor is there any evidence in the Record suggesting that a range of satisfactory 
results in a performance verification means there is a margin of error in the reported 
I The Hearing Official made Findings based on the Record created by Ms. Elias-Cruz: 
3.S The Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedure and the Operator Training Manuals do 
not require nor indicate that the actual test performed on a properly calibrated instrument be 
adjusted due to the margin of error of the simulator solution or testing instrument. 
3.9 Additionally, I.e. §lS-S002A does not provide nor allow for the margin of error to be taken 
into consideration with respect to the breath test results. 
3.10 In considering this argument such reasoning would have the effect of making the legal limit a 
moving target depending on which evidentiary testing instrument was used in a particular 
case. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 7, ALS R. p. 051. 
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blood alcohol content results. Ms. Elias-Cruz must do more to meet her burden. In re 
Mahurin, j 40 Idaho 656, 99 P.3d 125 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Whether the manufacturer recognizes a margin of error is not dispositive nor 
controlling on the Idaho State Police (ALS R. p. 027). 
Further, Ms. Elias-Cruz does not challenge the existence of cause for Trooper 
Schwecke's belief that she was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol resulting in his request that she perform evidentiary breath alcohol testing (I.C. § 
18-8002A(7)(b »). 
The only authority for Ms. Elias-Cruz's argument is an unpublished California 
decision, not an analysis of the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in McDaniel v. State, 
Dept. of Transp, 149 Idaho 643,239 P.3d 36 (2010). 
The Court of Appeals had no difficulty in .McDaniel, rejecting the application of a 
potential margin of error on breath alcohol testing results. The showing of the "actual" 
blood alcohol level is not required in the Administrative License Suspension setting, I.C. 
§§ 18-8002A(7)( c) and 18-8004). 
Ms. Elias-Cruz has the burden of showing that she did not fail an evidentiary test 
demonstrating a breath alcohol content of at least .02. The .02 breath alcohol test result 
here is as much a failed evidentiary test as the .083 evidentiary test result in "McDaniel. 
The exercise of mathematically calculating a potential range for blood alcohol content 
considering an inherent margin of error is certainly not contemplated either by the 
Legislature or by the Court in McDaniel. 2 
2 Such an analysis is reminiscent of retrograde extrapolation, a notion also rejected by the Idaho Court, 
Statev. Daniel, 132 Idaho 701 @703, 979 P.2d 103 (1998). 
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There is no basis in this Record to suggest that the .McDaniel Court was incorrect 
in its analysis other than arguing for a different policy result. Neither the District Court 
nor Ms. Elias-Cruz offers an analysis of the Court of Appeals decision in McDaniel or 
indicate why the Hearing Official was incorrect in his interpretation of I.C. § 18-
8002A(7) and I.e. § 18-8004.3 
Ms. Elias-Cruz does not argue that the administration of the breath alcohol testing 
did not meet the Standard Operating Procedures only that the Standard Operating 
Procedures should provide something different. 
In this very narrow context of the Administrative License Suspension for the 
failure of an evidentiary test, the Hearing Official's analysis of the application of 
McDaniel to these facts is clearly appropriate and indicates that there was substantial 
evidence in the Record supporting the conclusion that Ms. Elias-Cruz had not met her 
burden to show that the breath alcohol test was not administered consistent with the 
standards of I.C. § 18-8004. 
3 McDaniel's statutory interpretation is applicable here: 
The conclusion of these courts has primarily hinged on whether the license suspension statute is 
interpreted to require a driver's license to be suspended upon test results indicating a blood alcohol 
level in excess of the statutory limit, or alternatively, upon an actual level of alcohol in excess of the 
statutory limit .... The plain meaning of the statutory language is that a driver's license will be 
suspended upon test results indicating a BAC of O.OS or more, not O.OS plus or minus any margin of 
error .... Nowhere does I.e. § lS-S002A contain language that requires the Hearing Official to take into 
account any inherent error within the breath test machine before a license can be suspended, it simply 
requires that the test results indicate a BAC in excess of the legal limit, which is O.OS. See I.e. §§IS-
S002A( 4 )( a), IS-S004. Therefore, any inherent margin of error in the test results is 
disregarded .... McDaniels failed to establish that the Hearing Official was required to consider any 
inherent margin of error in the Intoxilyzer 5000 before suspending his driver's license. 
McDanielv. State, Dept. of Transp. 1491daho 643,239 P.3d 36 (Ct. App. 2010). 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 5 
2. 
The Hearing Official properly determined that the Lifeloc Fe 20 had been calibrated in 
accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures of the Idaho State Patrol. 
The Hearing Official determined that the Lifeloc FC 20 was properly calibrated.4 
Ms. Elias-Cruz's responds to this issue by offering argument which was not made 
to the Hearing Official (Respondent's Brief p. 13). The Hearing Official was asked to 
consider the effect of what Ms. Elias-Cruz's actual blood alcohol content may have been, 
that }.1cDaniel was wrongly decided and that Ms. Elias-Cruz's case is distinguishable 
from the }.1cDaniel decision (Tr. p. 14 LL. 5-13). The Hearing Official was not asked to 
set aside the suspension based on an annual calibration requirement, the existence of only 
one performance verification sample or a calibration with a .02 solution. 
There is no requirement that the Lifeloc FC 20 be annually calibrated (ALS R. p. 
027). In fact the only calibration information the Hearing Official has before him are 
reported calibrations on 08/18/2009 and 10/22/2010 (ALS R. p. 004). There is no 
testimony as to what it would mean if the Lifeloc FC 20 was not calibrated annually. The 
failure to offer such evidence indicates a failure of Ms. Elias-Cruz to meet her burden 
(I.e. § 18-8002A(7), In re Mahurin, 140 Idaho 656,99 P.3d 125 (2004). 
4 
5. 
Was the Evidentiary Testing Instrument Properly Calibrated and Approved for use Pursuant to ISP 
Standard Operating Procedure, and Was the Instrument Functioning Accurately at the Time of 
Breath-Testing. 
1. Alma Elias-Cruz submitted to an evidential breath test October 21, 20 I 0, at 2! 39 hours. 
4. The acceptable performance verification check conducted October 22, 2010, at 1930 hours, with 
performance verification results of.081, approved the breath testing instrument for evidentiary use in 
accordance with the ISP Standard Operating Procedure. 
5. The breath testing instrument was properly calibrated and approved for evidentiary testing of alcohol 
concentration, and the testing instrument was functioning accurately at the time of breath-testing. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 9, ALS R. 053. 
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Ms. Elias-Cruz simply asks the Court to come to a conclusion different than the 
Hearing OfficiaL There is no evidence in this Record that the Lifeloc FC 20 was not 
properly calibrated at the time it was used to test Ms. Elias-Cruz's breath alcohol content. 
There are only policy arguments offered as to what other states might have done or what 
might be reasonable to require under other situations. Such arguments are not 
appropriate in judicial review of a Hearing Official's decision to suspend Ms. Elias-
Cruz's driving privileges as a result of failing an evidentiary test by being under age of21 
and having .02 breath alcohol content (I.C § 67-5279) . 
Ms. Elias-Cruz argues that she has met her burden by demonstrating that two 
verification samples were not employed. The Record does not consist of any information 
as to the circumstances of the performance verification by the police officer 
administrating the breath alcohol testing. The only evidence in the Record has to the do 
with the calibration of the instrument not its performance verification. 5 
The lack of that information in the Record is Ms. Elias-Cruz's responsibility not 
the State's responsibility.6 Ms. Elias-Cruz fails to meet her burden by not demonstrating 
whether there was a deficiency in the implementation of the Standard Operating 
Procedures, In re Alahurin, 140 Idaho 656,99 P.3d 125 (2004). 
Ms. Elias-Cruz also argues that there should be a .02 performance verification. 
5 The Court of Appeals recently considered what evidence was in the record to review the circumstances of 
an adequate performance validation pursuant to the Standard Operating Procedures, In the ;tlatter of the 
Suspension of the Driver's License of Linda Lee Hubbard, Idaho Supreme Court, Docket No. 38969 (April 
12,2012). 
6 Consider the following: 
Archer presented no evidence demonstrating that a calibration check had not been performed or that 
the machine was not operating correctly. Archer bore the burden of proof at the ALS hearing and, 
because he produced no evidence regarding the lack of a calibration check or the reliability of the 
Alco-Sensor III, he failed to meet his burden of proof. Archer v. State Department of Transportation, 
145 Idaho 617, 181 P.3d 543 (2008). 
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There is nothing in the Standard Operating Procedures indicating a .02 performance 
verification requirement. 
There is no evidence that the Lifeloc FC 20 was not properly calibrated or that the 
Lifeloc FC 20 was not properly operating. Ms. Elias-Cruz called a forensic toxicologist 
to testify as to the operation of the Lifeloc equipment. Mr. Beals does not tesify that the 
Lifeloc FC 20 was not operating properly at the time that the breath tests were performed. 
In fact the entirety of Ms. Elias-Cruz's argument is based on the fact that the Lifeloc FC 
20 breath testing equipment was properly operating. 
Finally, the performance verification arguments were not made to the Hearing 
Official or to the Court on Judicial Review and should not become the basis to set aside 
the Hearing Official's decision, Bell v. Idaho Tramp. Dept. 151 Idaho 659, 262 P.3d 
1030 (2011). 
3. 
The Hearing Official's failure to acknowledge the Lffeloc FC 20 's margin of 
error did not deny J\1s. Elias-Cruz her ability to meet her burden or obtain a fair and 
impartial hearing. 
The due process argument was never argued to the Hearing Official (Tr. p. 14 LL. 
5-13). The due process argument was also not argued to the District Court. The failure 
to preserve this argument precludes the Court's review, BeZC 
..... because this constitutional issue was not raised to the Hearing Official we will not resolve it on 
appeal. See, Viveros v. State Dept. of Health and Welfare, 126ldaho 714, 889 P.2d 1104 (1995). Bell 
v. Idaho Transp. Dept. I5lIdaho 659,262 P.3d 1030 (2011). 
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Ms. Elias-Cruz clearly received a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to present 
her case to the Department's Hearing Official in an effort to meet her burden of proof. 8 
Should the Court consider the due process argument appropriately before it, the 
characterization of the issue by Ms. Elias-Cruz means that the "official action" is not the 
process of suspending Ms. Elias-Cruz's driving privileges but instead the official action 
is the decision making process of the Hearing Official. There is no due process violation 
when a Hearing Official does not adopt the conclusions argued as a result of expert 
testimony, particularly when the Hearing Official appropriately applies the McDaniel 
decision. 
The Mathews factors requires a consideration of Ms. Elias-Cruz's private interest 
in her driving privileges affected by the Department's official action to suspend her 
driving privileges. However, the District Court characterized the denial of due process as 
the Department's Hearing Official's failure to "accept" the testimony of toxicologist, 
Loring Beals. 
8 The analysis of a claim that the procedure provided was deficient requires an analysis of the Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 u.s. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed 2d 18 (1976): 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail. 
Neither the District Court or Ms. Elias-Cruz analyze the Mathews factors. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 9 
Ms. Elias-Cruz argues that the Hearing Official should not follow the law of the 
State of Idaho. The Hearing Official's decision making does not rise to the level of a due 
process violation simply by applying Idaho law.9 
Applying the second Mathews factor, there is no risk of an erroneous deprivation 
of Ms. Elias-Cruz's driving privileges based on the procedure utilyzed. The Hearing 
Official didn't disregard the testimony of Loring Beals. That testimony was part of the 
Record and Ms. Elias-Cruz was permitted to make the Record that she thought 
appropriate. The Hearing Official analyzed Loring Beals testimony and Ms. Elias-Cruz's 
argument and clearly explained why it was he was going to follow the ~McDaniel decision 
and not recognize an inherent margin of error (ALS R. p. 051, Finding 3.12).10 
The Hearing Official does not violate Ms. Elias-Cruz's due process rights when 
he rules against Ms. Elias-Cruz indicating why he did so. Ms. Elias-Cruz does not 
suggest that she has a constitutional right to a Hearing Official that would disregard 
existing Idaho law and decide contrary to the that law. The Hearing Official here simply 
does not make the conclusion that Ms. Elias-Cruz advocates should be made from that 
testimony, particularly considering that there was no testimony or argument that the 
breath testing equipment was not operating properly. 
9 The Hearing Official quotes from McDaniel in his order. (R. p. 051, Finding 3.12) The underlined 
portion of the Hearing Official's decision " ... any inherent margin of error in the test result is disregarded" 
is a correct citation and recitation of the Court of Appeals language in McDaniel. McDaniel v. State, Dept. 
of Transp. 149 Idaho 643,239 F.3d 36 (Ct. App. 2010). 
10 
In State of Idaho v. Bryan Lee McDaniel, Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho, 2010 Opinion No. 58, 
the court held that the plain meaning of the statutory language is that a driver's license will be 
suspended upon test results indicating a BAC of O.OS or more, not O.OS plus or minus any margin of 
error. .. Nowhere does I.e. § lS-S002A contain language that requires the Hearing Official to take into 
account any inherent error within the breath test machine before a license can be suspended, it simply 
requires that the test results indicate a BAC in excess of the legal limit, which is 0.08. Therefore, any 
inherent margin of error in the test results is disregarded. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Order, p. ALS R. p. 051. 
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Clearly, the Hearing Official weighed the evidence, considered the A1cDaniel 
decision and came to a reasonable conclusion explaining how he weighed the evidence. 
There is no argument that the Hearing Official was arbitrary and capricious in weighing 
the evidence as he did. The District Court and now Ms. Elias-Cruz do not indicate which 
department procedures were problematic only that the Hearing Official's weighing of the 
evidence consistent with Idaho law was problematic. 
There is no evidence as to what additional or substitute procedures should have 
been employed by the Hearing Official, instead Ms. Elias-Cruz argues for a result 
different than the clear application of Idaho law and advocates for a change in Idaho law 
based upon arguments which were not made to the Hearing Official or to the District 
Court. The conclusion of Ms. Elias-Cruz's argument is that it is just unfair to hold a 
driver under the age of 21 to a .02 breath alcohol content standard. It is just as unfair to 
hold an adult to a .08 breath alcohol content standard. 
The inquiry required by I.C. § 67-5279(3)(a) as to whether the decision of the 
Hearing Official would "violate due process" does not require an analysis of how 
evidence is weighed and considered by the Hearing Official. J I 
II Such an inquiry is contrary to "judicial review" of issues of fact, I.e. § 67-5277 and the deference due 
the Hearing Official as to the weight of evidence on questions offact, I.e. § 67 -5279( I). 
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A Strict application of li1cDaniel does not mean that Ms. Elias-Cruz or any other driver 
with a .02 could not prove a malfunction of the breath testing instrument. The Court of 
Appeals has specifically rejected such an analysis, In the Matter of the Suspension of the 
Driver's License of Linda Lee Hubbard, Docket No, 38969, Idaho Supreme Court, April 
10, 2012. 12 
There was no proof offered of a malfunction of the breath testing equipment 
either to the Hearing Official or to the District Court. The .02 standard in and of itself 
does nothing more than create an evidentiary standard to determine whether someone's 
conduct subjects them to the statutory requirement that a driver demonstrate the variety 
of factors set out in I.e. § 18-8002A to avoid a driver's license suspension. Ms. Elias-
Cruz could have solicited testimony from Loring Beals as to the circumstances of the 
operation or malfunction of the Lifeloc FC 20 at the time the test was performed by Ms. 
Elias-Cruz but did not. 
12 
Due process does not require the showing of "actual" blood alcohol content. It is 
Compliance with the ISP's standards for operation of the instrument is not a guarantee that it was 
operating correctly. Inadequate or incomplete operating standards and procedures could fail to 
disclose when a testing instrument is not functioning correctly. In Gibbar, we interpreted Idaho Code 
§ 18-8002A(7)( c) and (d) "as permitting [administrative license suspension] petitioners to challenge 
the results of their BAC test by proving that the testing equipment was inaccurate or was not 
functioning properly because the State has adopted procedures that do not ensure accuracy and proper 
functioning." Gibbar, 143 Idaho 947,155 P.3d at 1186. Similarly, in State v. Hartwig, 112 Idaho 370, 
732 P.2d 339 (Ct. App. 1987), we held that although breath test results were properly admitted into 
evidence at a criminal trial because the State showed that the designated state agency had approved the 
machine for use and that the machine was operated in compliance with approved standards, the 
reliability and performance of the machine is still subject to challenge. We stated: "If there is 
evidence that any particular machine has malfunctioned or was designed or operated so as to produce 
unreliable results, such evidence would be relevant to both the admissibility and weight of the test 
results." Id. at 375, 732 P.2d at 344. See also State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 400, 403-05, 17 P.3d 901, 904-
06 (Ct. App. 2001). Thus, compliance with standards approved by the ISP does not preclude a 
challenge under Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7)(d) that the testing equipment was not functioning properly 
when the test was administered. Of course, the burden to prove malfunction rests upon the petitioner, 
as noted above. 
Hubbardv. Dept. o/Transportation, Idaho Ct. App. April 10, 2012. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 12 
clearly within the province of the Legislature to determine whether breath alcohol content 
demonstrated by the failure of an evidentiary test subjects a driver to an Administrative 
License Suspension, McDaniel v. State, Dept. afTransp. 149 Idaha 643,239 P.3d 36 (Ct. 
App.2010). 
v. CONCLUSION 
Ms. Elias-Cruz failed to meet her burden pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7) to show 
that the breath alcohol testing was not performed in conformity with I.C. § 18-8004(4) 
and the Standard Operating Procedures of the Idaho State Police. 
Due process was not argued to the Hearing Official and is not implicated by the 
hearing process provided to Ms. Elias-Cruz. 
The Hearing Official's decision should be affirmed and Ms. Elias-Cruz's driving 
privileges should be suspended for 90 days. 
DATED this day of April 2012. 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
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